My fellow reporter at WNYC, Bob Hennelly, has been watching how the NYPD are responding to the Mumbai attacks. This is from a great piece he did last month, where he entered the Millennium Hotel near Times Square, and as could be expected, easily wandered the various floors without being questioned. Via the stairwell, he gets to the fifth floor and encounters a hotel guest from Houston, Tania Vaughn. From "How Safe are Hotels and other Urban Spaces":
HENNELLY: I am with WNYC National Public Radio and I am doing a story
about hotel security. As a customer how do you feel about it?
VAUGHN: I
don't think hotel security is adequate enough. I feel like anybody can
pretend to get locked out of a room and say to the housekeeping staff,
"oh let me in" and it could not be their room. I am on the 21st floor,
trying to keep her occupied for a couple of minutes. I have been just
wandering around looking into rooms nobody has asked me any question. I
am just floating around.
HENNELLY: In a statement responding to my ability to roam throughout their
Midtown property, Millennium Hotel management says they have extensive
security training in place. I was assured their lobby has a security
presence at all times. They add that in the days since the Mumbai
attacks -- and after my visit -- they conducted an additional training
session.
HENNELLY: Yet on Millennium's own Web site, complete floor plans are
readily available. And that's exactly the kind of information police
say the terrorists had in Mumbai.
Earlier this month at One Police Plaza, several hundred executives who
manage security for both public and private facilities packed an
auditorium to hear the NYPD's take on vulnerabilities in Mumbai."
The geopolitical intelligence journal Stratfor has a new report, Mitigating Mumbai, in which it notes the weak security at soft targets in the West, like hotels. But in the US and Europe, it says there are significant deterrents to anything on the order of Mumbai's attacks:
Among the most troubling aspects of the Mumbai attack were accounts by
journalists of Indian police shooting at the attackers and missing
them. Some journalists have said this failure can be explained by the
fact that many Indian police officers are armed with antiquated
revolvers and Lee-Enfield rifles. But the Lee-Enfield is an accurate
and reliable battle rifle that shoots a powerful cartridge, the .303
British.
Further down:
By and large, U.S. and European police officers are better-trained
marksmen than their Indian counterparts. U.S. and European officers
also must regularly go to the shooting range for marksmanship
requalification to maintain those skills. This means that in a
Mumbai-type scenario in the United States or Europe, the gunmen would
not have been allowed the freedom of movement they were in Mumbai,
where they were able to walk past police officers firing at them
without being hit.
Last week, NYPD commissioner Ray Kelly was in DC, speaking to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. I've pasted his full remarks below, in which he raises the issue of the media disclosing law enforcement tactics in real time, something that has been heavily debated in the Indian media since the attacks (In Outlook magazine, Shrinidhi Hande recommended banning live reporting of such attacks).
One of Kelly's most noted points was that the Mumbai attackers used cell phones to such advantage: From the AP:
Kelly said his department is examining ways it might be able to shut
down cell phone calls in and around future hostage-taking scenarios,
without also shutting down the communications devices of the police
trying to rescue them.
More from Reuters:
New York sent representatives to Mumbai to study the attacks and the
response, and conducted simulations on how its police would respond.
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