MUMBAI ATTACKS: Essays/op-eds/interviews worth reading

[See SAJAforum's full coverage of the Mumbai attacks]

There's already a lot  - a lot! - of opinion pieces, commentaries, essays, etc, about the Mumbai attacks - and I am having trouble sorting the bad from the good. So I'd like us to do something we did at other such landmark events over the course of SAJA's 15-year history: highlight some essays worth reading. But unlike events such as 9/11; the death of Kalpana Chawla and other astronauts in the Shuttle disaster; the tsunami, etc, technology now allows the SAJA community to share the good pieces directly, rather than waiting for SAJA moderators to do the posting.

Here are some to get us started. I'll add some here as I find them, but please add your favorites in the comments below. Thoughtful, important pieces only, please. And please post using the same format I am using here.

SUKETU MEHTA, author of “Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found” and journalism professor at New York University, writing in The New York Times:
What They Hate About Mumbai
EXCERPT: Mumbai is a “soft target,” the terrorism analysts say. Anybody can walk into the hotels, the hospitals, the train stations, and start spraying with a machine gun. Where are the metal detectors, the random bag checks? In Mumbai, it’s impossible to control the crowd. In other cities, if there’s an explosion, people run away from it. In Mumbai, people run toward it — to help. Greater Mumbai takes in a million new residents a year. This is the problem, say the nativists. The city is just too hospitable. You let them in, and they break your heart.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/opinion/29mehta.html

SHASHI THAROOR, author and former UN official, writing in Tina Brown's TheDailyBeast.com:
City Under Siege
EXCERPT: This year alone, terrorist bombs have taken lives in Jaipur, in Ahmedabad, in Delhi and (in an eerie dress-rehearsal for the effectiveness of synchronicity) several different places on one searing day in the state of Assam. Jaipur is the lodestar of Indian tourism to Rajasthan; Ahmedabad is the primary city of Gujarat, the state that is a poster child for India’s development, with a local GDP growth rate of 14%; Delhi is the nation’s political capital and India’s window to the world; Assam was logistically convenient for terrorists from across a porous border. Mumbai combined all four elements of its precursors: by attacking it, the terrorists hit India’s economy, its tourism, and its internationalism, and they took advantage of the city’s openness to the world. A grand slam.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2008-11-26/terror-in-mumbai/

FAREED ZAKARIA, journalist and author, gave an interview to Newsweek.com:
The Mayhem in Mumbai
EXCERPT: I think India is showing remarkable resilience. They're trying to get back to business as usual. They were planning to open the stock market, which is not far from the Taj; they ultimately decided that that might have been a bridge too far, but they're encouraging people to go back to work. That's the best thing about an open society. They're trying to project an image of resilience.
http://www.newsweek.com/id/17100

SANDIP ROY, New America Media editor and radio show host, wrote in a piece that also ran in Salon:
Mumbai Terrorists Wear Uniform of Young India
EXCERPT: The assailants, even as they demanded American and British passports, apparently were not English-speaking. They spoke in Urdu and Hindi.  In a country where every car entering one of the grand new shopping malls has its trunk inspected by uniformed security, how did they know they could walk into the five star hotel with AK-47s and grenades?  In the hushed glamor of the Taj with its 24-hour coffee shops and golden luggage carts, did they walk in through the front door, past the liveried doorman like they belonged? Did they stride into the dining room of the five-star Oberoi where diamond merchants make deals and Bollywood starlets wait to be spotted by gossip columnists like they wanted a table – dinner for three, we have no reservations. "These are the places where what Indians call 'the creamy layer' hang out," says Mira Kamdar, author of Planet India on a recent webcast organized by the South Asian Journalists Association. She says these are the places where Bombay's elite feel safe and cocooned. It's their "islands of security" amidst the chaos of South Bombay. "It's the elite of Bombay who are really going to be shaken," says Kamdar.
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=050dc87c7cffe019c7177175cefe1ad8

ROHIT CHOPRA, media academic, writing in the AntiHistory blog:
Islam, Terror, and the Failures of the Intellectual Left
EXCERPT: Here are some reflections on my blog on, Islam, Terror, and the Failures of the Intellectual Left, based, in part, on the horrific events of the last two days and the kinds of reactions I suspect we will see. The Right has already started with its blanket condemnations of Islam. And the Left has also started its usual apologetics about how Indian state action, anti-Kashmir action etc compels Muslims to
take such actions.
http://antihistory.blogspot.com/2008/11/apologetics-from-left-about-bombay.html

TAREK FATAH, Toronto-based writer, in the Ottawa Citizen (his daughter's piece is below):
Real target of Mumbai terrorists: Severing the hand of friendship
EXCERPT: The mayhem in Mumbai had barely subsided when I received the first e-mail suggesting the terrorist attacks had been carried out by agents of Mossad ---- Israel's military intelligence -- masquerading as Islamic terrorists to give Muslims a bad name.  Alex James of Toronto forwarded a news item claiming, "India's Internal Security Police are now holding and questioning an identified Israeli Mossad agent, who had been in communication with some of the alleged terrorists in India two weeks before the BLACK OP attacks took place." As ridiculous as this may sound, chances are countless Muslims are deluding themselves into believing that it is not their co-religionists who are responsible for the savagery let loose on India, but some hidden hand that is part of a U.S.-Zionist conspiracy against Islam.
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/opinion/story.html?id=e7a2a383-f713-48d8-aa82-d26c079167d0

NATASHA FATAH, Tarek's daughter, writes in CBC News about the city her grandfather and great-grandfather left behind when they left when India was partitioned in 1947:
Lament for Mumbai: Tears as the City of Joy Burns
EXCERPT:
A particularly sinister type of evil crept into Mumbai this week. The type that stalks innocent people as they board commuter trains at a busy downtown station. The type that opens fire on families eating quietly at a cafe. The type that takes dozens of visitors and newcomers hostage while they are still coming to terms with a foreign land. t was with deep sorrow that I watched the news as the city of Mumbai burned. As those groups of highly organized, hate-filled young men stormed and destroyed some of the most glorious spots of that most beautiful city, a sense of hopelessness washed over those of us who love Mumbai.
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/11/27/f-vp-fatah.html

Post essays worth reading below. If you want to comment on a particular essay posted here already, please be clear which piece you are talking about.

Comments

[Sree Sreenivasan]

SALIL TRIPATHI, London-based freelancer, writing in FEER.com:
Bombay Burning
EXCERPT: And it is that openness that the terrorists want to attack. In his 1995 novel, "The Moor's Last Sigh," Salman Rushdie wrote: "Those who hated India, those who sought to ruin it, would need to ruin Bombay…"

Bombay's citizens will probably demonstrate, once again, their humanity. (Friends stranded near Ground Zero, the Taj Mahal Hotel, found that a hotel where they had to stay the night refused to charge them for the room). Over the next few hours and days there will be many more similar stories, of that there is no doubt.

But what about its leaders? Granted, that in a democratic society you cannot have a surveillance mechanism that keeps track of everyone who enters the city, and you cannot inspect every box, every boat, every packet, and every car that comes in. But this is colossal intelligence failure. The resignation of a politician or two, the removal of an intelligence chief or two, can hardly be the answer. Systematic changes will be needed. It means longer security queues, better weapons for the city's police (and more important, better training when to use them), superior surveillance techniques, and accountability.
http://feer.com/politics/2008/november/bombay-burning

UDAYAN TRIPATHI, Salil's son, 19, writing in the Georgetown paper:
On Bombay in Georgetown
EXCERPT: So what of Bombay today? How is that riotious, raucous, tantalising, and turbulent city faring these days. As we saw over the course of this afternoon, not so well. I was born in Bombay 19 years ago. The neighbourhood you see on CNN, blood splattered across its dark deserted streets is mine. The glass shards from Padminis, Ambassadors, and Mercedes Benzes lie strewn across paving stones on which I have walked. The rumble of army trucks has shaken the foundations of century-old buildings minutes away from my birthplace. And my birthplace is Bombay Hospital, tonight just one of the locations where those wounded by the ones shot by AK-47 wielding youths are brought. Alan Jones, quoted all over the BBC World Service talks of them in their jeans and t-shirts as they sprayed bullets across the magnificent lobby of the Taj Mahal Hotel. A lobby which I can picture, right now, from memory. I know which ornaments are probably lying across the ground. Across bodies. And the leather sofas and the granite desk with its M. F. Husain mural and the LVMH store and the rug too. Blood-stained? Bullet-ridden?
http://www.sticksandstonesblog.com/2008/11/27/on-bombay-from-georgetown/

[Udayan Tripathi]

AMIT CHAUDHURI, novelist, poet, musician, in the Guardian
Mumbai: the city I love
EXCERPT: From different windows and balconies in those two flats, at different points of my life until 1982, when my father retired, the dome of the Taj (the "old" Taj, as it came to be known after the arrival of its neighbour, the Taj Intercontinental) was visible, grey, as seemingly and deceptively stationary as a low cloud. Like Calcutta, and unlike Delhi, with its Moghul and Sultanate lineage, Bombay had no really great historical or religious monuments; its landmarks, in keeping with the fact that it was the progeny of an almost innocent-seeming colonial modernity, were secular ones - hotels; cinema halls, such as the Eros, the Regal, the Metro; grand, untidy railway stations such as the Victoria Terminus. To call the Taj the "old" Taj was to deliberately indulge in a flagrant misnomer, and a reminder of Bombay's willingness to rewrite history in terms of the urban, the kitschy, the comic: it was as if the "real" Taj Mahal in Agra had never existed except in those most incredible of objects - school textbooks.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/28/mumbai-amit-chaudhuri-india

[Amar]

By Sambit Bal - Cricinfo

Cricket feels so trivial, so utterly irrelevant now. I have sat for nearly 24 hours before the TV, watching the world's most resilient city in the thrall of a terrifying and seemingly never-ending siege. Watching the Taj Mahal hotel burn for two days has felt like living through Mumbai's own 9/11, for the Taj is not merely a five-star hotel, it is a symbol of the city's identity, an iconic link between its rich past and bustling present.

I have watched a city of a million dreams held hostage by 20 or so men who have purged from their souls every trace of humanity - let's not confer on them the dignity of a religion - and I have felt the blood drain out of me.

I have felt a sense of paralysis and rage. My family and I are safe at home, none of my friends were in the hotels or at the other attack sites; but I am numb, not with fear or personal loss, but something far deeper: a sense of overpowering bleakness.

Through the day I have had a job to do. Mumbai's tragedy has brought serious implications for cricket, and I have spent my time also following the discussions between the cricket boards of India, England and Australia; chatting with colleagues in Brisbane, London and Bangalore; calling English journalists for updates; deciding headlines and story angles. Never has my job felt like such a chore, so meaningless and futile. Rarely have I been as distracted or conflicted.

[Aparita]

EXCERPT: Three days after the Mumbai attacks, it is unclear who is behind them. And that in itself tells a story.

Terrorism experts have been all over television and the Internet speculating on the identity of the perpetrators, more often than not attempting to divine their identity from the group's tactics. The problem is that terrorists do not follow rule books; they learn and adapt from other groups. The fact that suicide bombers did not blow themselves up in the lobbies of the Oberoi or Taj hotels does not mean they are not from al-Qaeda. (See photos of the chaos in Mumbai)

What we should be certain of, though, is that the Mumbai attackers were combat trained. You do not sustain a military assault for three days, taking only combat naps, unless you know what you are doing. You have to have been shot at before. You cannot be intimidated by flash-bang grenades, or commandos fast-roping down the side of a building. And it is almost certain that the planners of the attack understood that the only way to get into India with the amount of weapons and explosives used in the attacks was by sea — the risk of smuggling them in over land was too great.

Indulging in the same sort of speculation as the terrorism experts, I would say it's likely the attackers picked up their combat experience in Afghanistan. They could have come out of Iraq as well, but Mumbai seems a little far afield for Iraqis. Again, at this point none of this is certain. We may find out the killers were Hindu extremists, or Tamil separatists.

[Rupa Dev]

YOICHI SHIMATSU, former editor of The Japan Times in Tokyo and journalism lecturer at Tsinghua University in Beijing, wrote:
Dawood -- Did Criminal Mastermind Stage Mumbai Nightmare?

EXCERPT:Dawood, ranks fourth on Forbes' list of the world's 10 most wanted fugitives from the law. After the new round of attacks that killed more than 100 people and laid waste top five-star hotels, Dawood can now contend for the No.1 spot in the coming months and years. In contrast to the fanatic and often ineffective bin Laden, Dawood is professional on all counts and therefore a far more formidable adversary. Yet some in Pakistan's military intelligence agency say that Dawood is dead, killed in July. This version of events is much the same as a variation of the bin Laden story. If true, then his underlings are carrying on the mission of an outlaw transfigured into a legend.
http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=050dc87c7cffe019c7177175cefe1ad8

[Partha Banerjee]

In his New York Times oped "What They Hate About Mumbai," Suketu Mehta writes:

"In other cities, if there's an explosion, people run away from it. In Mumbai, people run toward it — to help."

Read his article at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/29/opinion/29mehta.html?_r=1&em .

Without taking away the high passion for the city he grew up in, isn't
the statement a little too condescending (and insulting for the rest of India)? Does he know the rest of India?

Any why remind us that Amitabh Bacchan owns guns? We know he can afford and use it. Maybe, he should start a new chapter of NRA in India.

Anything is possible now.

###

[sree sreenivasa]

ANAND GIRIHARADAS, NYT/IHT correspondent, writing in the IHT:
Terrorism suddenly gets personal for many Indians
EXCERPT: But what slowly became clear was that this was an attack of especial barbarism, because it was so personal. It was unlike the many strikes of the last many months, bombs left in thronging markets or trains or cars: acts of shrinking cowardice.

The new men were not cowards. They seemed to prolong the fight as long as they could. They killed face to face; they wanted to see and speak to their victims; they could taste the violence they made.

A good story has characters, and a terrorist attack without characters tempts a society to forget. A wave of recent Indian attacks, more anonymous and less dramatic, offered little focus for public opinion.

For better or worse, the public has its characters now. As the weekend arrived, it was not clear who the men were, even as the Indian government hinted at Pakistani connections. But even without learning their names, it was so easy to imagine them this time, combing the hallways, asking life-or-death questions, pulling women and children from their rooms at midnight.
http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=18258171

[Gustavo cavaliere]

I take a great pleasure in contacting you.

The present letter was sent to hundreds of Hoteliers for the past two months, and another terrorist attack at luxury hotels just happened, this time in Mumbai, but still nobody is listening.
I just hope that Hoteliers are ready now to take action and prevent this to happen to their properties.

Last September deadly blast at Marriott Hotel in Islamabad was especially shocking for me.
Four months ago I personally sent a Newsletter to several Hotel Organizations, Luxury Hotel General Managers, Owners, Tourism Boards and others in regards to this matter, but it looks like nobody is listening!!

Attacks like this happened before and will happen again and again, and we, all the people who work in the Hospitality business must face this reality and do whatever it takes to minimize any future undesirable outcomes.
Our guests and employees are dying, but it looks like nobody is listening.

Despite the severity of some terror attacks on hotels, it is highly unlikely that we will see significant security measures, legislation or funding allocated to defend lodging facilities. Hotels presently do not have adequate defense measures in place should suicide bombers accelerate their terror timetable against hotels and their security protocols are incomplete and obsolete.

I take as an example the city of Dubai.
Has being said that the recurring subject of dinner party conversations by the beach-side villas in this city has not been "will it happen here?" but "why hasn't it happened yet?"

Regardless the open discussion towards to the veracity of what was stated, the targets are certainly everywhere.
The reality is that a direct attack on Dubai, Macau or any other urban wonderland would knock the image of them causing a diversity of casualties and commercial damages. Then the after-dinner conversation will surely change to "will it happen again?"

From seven-star hotels to luxury malls, casinos and cruise ships to some very unique hidden paradisiacal resorts, many cities worldwide are a smorgasbord of choice for any lunatic, New York , London and Madrid are heartbreaking examples. Who will be next?
Seems to me that Hotel General Managers, Hospitality Directors and other Corporate Management members still don´t under­stand that the terrorists success to a Hotel attack is a result of them being focused in their only objective and their decision to do whatever it takes to accomplish their task, manager’s don´t.

To clarify this, a terrorist job is much easier than most Hotel managers. Hoteliers have more pressure!
General Managers are focused on their budget, the next meeting, the image of their brand and many other corporative and managerial time consuming demanding tasks, and, as a result, do not perceive the actual vulnerability of their properties, their high risk and the fact that utilizing the resources that they already have, all their properties, employees and guests could be much better secured.
The major difference between the most and least successful executives is the latter's lack of awareness. Successful executives are critical of their own performance and are continuously looking to get feedback on their performances.
 
Hotel Corporations did not made the decision to have “The best secured Hotel”. Guests, employees and their own Hotel security are still relegated, they are not a priority. Most of the top luxury Hotels of the world have today immense security breaches making them incredibly vulnerable.
Tourism Corporations race to the first and best in everything, service, quality, luxury, you name it. Spa´s, Casinos, Cruises, Airlines and others hire the best’s chefs, managers and directors to run their properties around the world, purchase high end security technology to protect their assets, spending millions of shareholders funds, but they still insecure and are at high risk.

Corporations in the Tourism Industry already have essential tools; the problem is that they are not taking advantage of them. Actually, these priceless tools they have, useless today, are more a problem for them rather than a passport to a safer Hotel. There is no need for more sophisticated machinery.

The Feedback Company has designed a simple and effective process that offers a solution to Hotels, Airlines and Cruise Ships that minimize the risk of a possible successful attempt against your company´s assets. Our program brings to the Tourism In­dustry Owners, Managers and Corporations the opportunity to evaluate and test their actual security capacity and protocols against a potential terrorist attack to their property.
We will expose your properties vulnerability and design a customized system utilizing your actual resources. We give feedback and solutions.
"The insider threat is real. It is a concern."
Any terrorist attack to a Luxury Hotel, Resort or Casino would cause loss of life and hugely damage their business and country economy. Together with the Airline and Cruise ship industry, Hotels are very easy soft targets regardless of the amount, size or importance of their actual security department performance or equipment.
There is no need for another award celebration, ribbons or councils. The “Safest Hotel Award” should be a tight first place tie between all of us in the Tourism Industry.

As part of The Feedback Company´s commitment to have a safer tourism industry and to have Hotel Corporations to create a conscience of the high risk they are facing. I personally invite all owners, managers, directors or CEO´s from any Hotel, Airline or Cruise ship Corporations to have one of their properties evaluated at no cost and to compre­hend their vulnerability. This offer is valid worldwide.

As off today, you still have time to act and prevent unwanted situations like the one happened last September at the Marriot Hotel . Unwanted situation that is actually feasible in many beautiful worldwide Hotel properties.
The question remains which Hotel will be next.?

Is time to act, anticipate and minimize any possibility of another Hotel terrorist hit. Anything done to prevent one more victim is valid.
We can help, and together assemble a safer Tourism Industry.

Kind Regards,

Gustavo Cavaliere
CEO - Executive Director
The Feedback Company
www.thefeedbackcompany.org
gcc@thefeedbackcompany.org

Global Hoteliers Club Member

[Sandhya]

This is one of the best essays I've read over the past five days.
ARAVIND ADIGA, Booker Prize author of "The White Tiger" writing in the Times Online:
A Wounded City Turns from Tears to Anger
EXCERPT: When other Indians say “Taj”, they mean the world-famous marble monument in Agra; when people in Bombay speak of the Taj, they mean India's grandest hotel, the Taj Mahal hotel at the Gateway of India. The middle-class can afford to have tea; richer people can dine here; and only the super-rich, or visitors from abroad, can stay in this hotel. And yet all residents of Bombay regard this hotel with an intensity of pride and affection. We love the Taj because it is, frankly speaking, better than anything else in this city.... a perfect emblem for Bombay - the city that was dredged out of swamp and sea and populated with migrants from across the world.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article5254236.ece

[Ramesh Rao]

Steve Coll in The New Yorker:

THE NEW YORKER

December 1, 2008
Lashkar-e-Taiba
Steve Coll

Indian and American officials are now reporting that the Mumbai attackers seem to have connections to Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistan-based Islamist organization. Among other analytical clues, over the weekend, one anonymous American official quoted in the Washington Post noted that Lashkar has a known “maritime” capability. I’m not sure how much seaworthiness a group needs to demonstrate in order to be labeled “maritime” terrorists, but I can testify to the existence of Lashkar’s pontoon boat fleet, as I was not too long ago a passenger on that line.

Late in 2005, I travelled for The New Yorker to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to report on the earthquake that devastated the region. To facilitate international aid, the Pakistani government opened the region to journalists, creating a very rare opportunity to travel without escort and to poke around on the border. I was particularly interested in looking up Lashkar, which I had been following for many years. I made several visits to facilities run by its charity, called “Jamat-ud-Dawa,” which is today tolerated openly by the government of Pakistan but banned as a terrorist organization by the United States on the grounds that it is merely an alias for Lashkar.

In Muzuffarabad, the capital of Pakistani Kashmir, Jamat had brought in a mobile surgical unit staffed by long-bearded doctors from Karachi and Lahore—very impressive young men, fluent in English, who offered a reminder that unlike, say, the Taliban, Lashkar draws some very talented people from urban professions. (With its hospitals, universities, and social-service wings, Lashkar is akin to Hezbollah or Hamas; it is a three-dimensional political and social movement with an armed wing, not merely a terrorist or paramilitary outfit.) As part of its earthquake relief work, Lashkar ferried supplies to remote villages isolated on the far side of the churning Neelum River, one of the two snow-fed canyon rivers that traverse the area. I asked to take a ride with its volunteers, and their media officer (yes, they have media officers) agreed.

We rode in a van to the river’s edge, scrambled down a rocky hillside and boarded one of Lashkar’s rubber pontoon boats, about fifteen feet long, with a large outboard motor—useful for carrying relief supplies, but not coincidentally, also useful for infiltrating militants into Indian-held Kashmir. It has long been an open secret, and a source of some hilarity among foreign correspondents, that under the guise of “humanitarian relief operations,” Lashkar practiced amphibious operations on a lake at its vast headquarters campus, outside Lahore. The events in Mumbai have taken the humor of these “humanitarian” rehearsals away. That day on the Neelum, I chatted with our thick-bearded captain in my very poor Arabic. He spoke Arabic as well—from his religious studies, he said, although he conceded, too, that he had travelled to Saudi Arabia, where it is well understood that Lashkar has raised money. I was also told that around the time of the earthquake they set up fund-raising operations in Britain, to tap the Pakistani diaspora there.

Earlier this year, I met with a Lashkar official in Lahore. We talked about how Jamat was getting along under international pressure. I took no notes and the conversation was intended for my informal guidance, but I came away with a number of impressions. On the one hand, the group’s bank accounts remain unmolested by the Pakistani government, which gives Lashkar quite a lot of running room; on the other, the group resents the accommodations reached between Pakistan’s government and the United States. Clearly, Lashkar knows what it must do to protect the Pakistan government from being exposed in the violent operations that Lashkar runs in Kashmir and elsewhere. For example, some of its younger volunteers wanted to join the fight with the Taliban in Western Pakistan and Afghanistan, my interlocutor said, and so Jamat had evolved an internal H.R. policy by which these young men would turn in their Jamat identity cards and go West “on their own time,” much as think tanks allow policy scholars to take leaves of absence to advise political campaigns.

One question that will certainly arise as the Mumbai investigations proceed is what the United States should insist the government of Pakistan do about Jamat and Lashkar. Even for a relative hawk on the subject of Pakistan’s support for Islamist militias, it’s a difficult question—comparable to the difficult question of managing Hezbollah’s place in the fragile Lebanese political system. To some extent, Pakistan’s policy of banning Lashkar and tolerating Jamat has helpfully reinforced Lashkar’s tendency toward nonviolent social work and proseltyzing. In the long run, this work is a threat to the secular character of Pakistan, but it is certainly preferable to revolutionary violence and upheaval right now. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the Army and I.S.I. continue to use Jamat’s legitimate front as a vehicle for prosecution of a long-running “double game” with the United States, in which Pakistan pledges fealty to American counterterrorism goals while at the same time facilitating guerrilla violence against India, particularly over the strategic territory of Kashmir, which Pakistan regards as vital to its national interests.

Lashkar is a big organization with multiple arms and priorities and its leadership is undoubtedly divided over how much risk to take in pursuit of violent operations in India, particularly given the comfort and even wealth the group’s leaders enjoy from their unmolested activities inside Pakistan. If the boys in Mumbai had support from Lashkar, did the group’s leader, Hafez Saeed, who runs Jamat, know of the plan? If so, that would be a radical act that would likely mean the end of his charity’s tenuous legitimacy.

If it can be credibly established that Saeed did not know—that this was a rogue operation of some sort, or a strategy cooked up by elements of Lashkar and groups such as the Pakistani Taliban or even Al Qaeda (perhaps conducted, too, with support from rogue elements of the Paksitan security forces)—that would be an even more complicated equation. I was at a conference this morning where another panelist well-versed in these issues said he would not be surprised if it turned out that Lashkar conceived the Mumbai attacks as a way to pull Pakistani Army units and attention away from the Afghan border and into defense positions in the east, to protect the country from the possibility of military retaliation by India. In any event, if the evidence does show that uncontrolled Lashkar elements carried out the attacks, it would force India’s government to judge how to calibrate policy toward a civilian-led Pakistan government and Army command that may have little control over the very same Islamist groups that it purposefully built up and supported just a few years ago. If the evidence shows that these were purposeful attacks endorsed by Saeed and aided by elements of the Army, then the Pakistan government will have no choice but to at least make a show of closing down Jamat and arresting Saeed.
Unfortunately, it has taken such action in the past, but that action has turned out to be partially symbolic and constructed for international consumption, rather than marking a true and complete change in policy.

The U.S. can do a few useful things here. At a minimum, it can provide transparent information about the investigation and where the facts lead, so that the Indian and Pakistani political systems are on the same footing; it can indict individuals and groups that can be established as culpable for the Mumbai murders, no matter who those individuals and groups are—even if they include officers in the Pakistan Army; and it can emphasize in public that the United States seeks the end of all Pakistani support for terrorist groups, no matter whether they are operating in Afghanistan, Kashmir, or Mumbai.

[Ramesh Rao]

Robert Kagan in The Washington Post:

The Sovereignty Dodge
What Pakistan Won't Do, the World Should

By Robert Kagan
Tuesday, December 2, 2008; A21

"We don't think the world's great nations and countries can be held hostage by non-state actors," Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari said yesterday. Fair enough. But what is the world to do when those non-state actors operate from the territory of a state and are the creation of that state's intelligence services?

One can feel sympathy for Zardari's plight. He and his new civilian government did not train or assist the Pakistani terrorist organizations that probably carried out last week's attacks in Mumbai. Nor is it his fault that al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other dangerous groups operate in Waziristan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of western Pakistan, from which they launch attacks on U.S. and European forces trying to bring peace to Afghanistan. For that we can thank elements of the Pakistani military, Pakistani intelligence and the late military dictatorship of Pervez Musharraf. Reversing decades-old policies of support for these groups may be impossible for any Pakistani leader, especially when the only forces capable of rooting them out are the same forces that created them and sustain them.

So if the world is indeed not to be held hostage by non-state actors operating from Pakistan, what can be done? The Bush administration is right to press Pakistan to cooperate fully with India's investigation of the Mumbai attacks. But that may not have much effect. Pakistani intelligence services have already balked at sending their top official to India to help. Nor is mere cooperation by Pakistan likely to satisfy the outraged Indian people. They, like Americans after Sept. 11, 2001, want to see some action taken against the groups that carried out the attacks. So all the warnings in the world may not be enough to forestall an Indian attack, especially given the Indian government's political vulnerability, even if it risks another Indo-Pakistani war.

Rather than simply begging the Indians to show restraint, a better option could be to internationalize the response. Have the international community declare that parts of Pakistan have become ungovernable and a menace to international security. Establish an international force to work with the Pakistanis to root out terrorist camps in Kashmir as well as in the tribal areas. This would have the advantage of preventing a direct military confrontation between India and Pakistan. It might also save face for the Pakistani government, since the international community would be helping the central government reestablish its authority in areas where it has lost it. But whether or not Islamabad is happy, don't the international community and the United States, at the end of the day, have some obligation to demonstrate to the Indian people that we take attacks on them as seriously as we take attacks on ourselves?

Would such an action violate Pakistan's sovereignty? Yes, but nations should not be able to claim sovereign rights when they cannot control territory from which terrorist attacks are launched. If there is such a thing as a "responsibility to protect," which justifies international intervention to prevent humanitarian catastrophe either caused or allowed by a nation's government, there must also be a responsibility to protect one's neighbors from attacks from one's own territory, even when the attacks are carried out by "non-state actors."

In Pakistan's case, the continuing complicity of the military and intelligence services with terrorist groups pretty much shreds any claim to sovereign protection. The Bush administration has tried for years to work with both the military and the civilian government, providing billions of dollars in aid and advanced weaponry. But as my Carnegie Endowment colleague Ashley Tellis has noted, the strategy hasn't shown much success. After Mumbai, it has to be judged a failure. Until now, the military and intelligence services have remained more interested in wielding influence in Afghanistan through the Taliban and fighting India in Kashmir through terrorist groups than in cracking down. Perhaps they need a further incentive -- such as the prospect of seeing parts of their country placed in an international receivership.

Would the U.N. Security Council authorize such action? China has been Pakistan's ally and protector, and Russia might have its own reasons for opposing a resolution. Neither likes the idea of breaking down the walls of national sovereignty -- except, in Russia's case, in Georgia -- which is why they block foreign pressure on Sudan concerning Darfur, and on Iran and other rogue states. This would be yet another test of whether China and Russia, supposed allies in the war against terrorism, are really interested in fighting terrorism outside their own borders. But if such an action were under consideration at the United Nations, that might be enough to gain Pakistan's voluntary cooperation. Either way, it would be useful for the United States, Europe and other nations to begin establishing the principle that Pakistan and other states that harbor terrorists should not take their sovereignty for granted. In the 21st century, sovereign rights need to be earned.

Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes a monthly column for The Post.

[Ramesh Rao]

Tom Friedman's op-ed and my comments in the NYT:

http://community.nytimes.com/article/comments/2008/12/03/opinion/03friedman.html?s=1&pg=2#postComment

Mr. Friedman: As long as there are academics, media commentators, left wing ideologues, and platitudinous nincompoops proposing that "we go to the root of the problem," and supporting the cause of those "poor, discriminated Muslims around the world," there will be unrepented terrorist massacres and the self-righteous Islamists making excuses for such vulgar hatred. We are used to two kinds of Pakistanis -- the sophisticated, spin-meisters who talk from both sides of their mouth, and the raving, AK-47 waving hordes. I am yet to see any critical mass of sane, rational, concerned group of Pakistanis who will take to the streets to bring about change in that country. It is nice of you, though, to try and appeal to that "imagined community".

— Rao R N, Farmville, VA

[Ramesh Rao]

Heroes At The Taj
Author: Michael Pollack
Publication: Forbes.com
Date: December 1, 2008
URL:
http://www.forbes. com/opinions/ 2008/12/01/ mumbai-terror- taj-oped- cx_mp_1201pollac k.html

After a terrifying day, one eyewitness thanks his saviors.

My story begins innocuously, with a dinner reservation in a world-class
hotel. It ends 12 hours later after the Indian army freed us.

My point is not to sensationalize events. It is to express my gratitude
and pay tribute to the staff of the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai, who
sacrificed their lives so that we could survive. They, along with the
Indian army, are the true heroes that emerged from this tragedy.

My wife, Anjali, and I were married in the Taj's Crystal Ballroom. Her
parents were married there, too, and so were Shiv and Reshma, the couple
with whom we had dinner plans. In fact, my wife and Reshma, both Bombay
girls, grew up hanging out and partying the night away there and at the
Oberoi Hotel, another terrorist target.

The four of us arrived at the Taj around 9:30 p.m. for dinner at the
Golden Dragon, one of the better Chinese restaurants in Mumbai. We were
a little early, and our table wasn't ready. So we walked next door to
the Harbour Bar and had barely begun to enjoy our beers when the host
told us our table was ready. We decided to stay and finish our drinks.

Thirty seconds later, we heard what sounded like a heavy tray smashing
to the ground. This was followed by 20 or 30 similar sounds and then
absolute silence. We crouched behind a table just feet away from what we
now knew were gunmen. Terrorists had stormed the lobby and were firing
indiscriminately.

We tried to break the glass window in front of us with a chair, but it
wouldn't budge. The Harbour Bar's hostess, who had remained at her post,
motioned to us that it was safe to make a run for the stairwell. She
mentioned, in passing, that there was a dead body right outside in the
corridor. We believe this courageous woman was murdered after we ran
away.

(We later learned that minutes after we climbed the stairs, terrorists
came into the Harbour Bar, shot everyone who was there and executed
those next door at the Golden Dragon. The staff there was equally brave,
locking their patrons into a basement wine cellar to protect them. But
the terrorists managed to break through and lob in grenades that killed
everyone in the basement.)

We took refuge in the small office of the kitchen of another restaurant,
Wasabi, on the second floor. Its chef and staff served the four of us
food and drink and even apologized for the inconvenience we were
suffering.

Through text messaging, e-mail on BlackBerrys and a small TV in the
office, we realized the full extent of the terrorist attack on Mumbai.
We figured we were in a secure place for the moment. There was also no
way out.

At around 11:30 p.m., the kitchen went silent. We took a massive wooden
table and pushed it up against the door, turned off all the lights and
hid. All of the kitchen workers remained outside; not one staff member
had run.

The terrorists repeatedly slammed against our door. We heard them ask
the chef in Hindi if anyone was inside the office. He responded calmly:
"No one is in there. It's empty." That is the second time the Taj staff
saved our lives.

After about 20 minutes, other staff members escorted us down a corridor
to an area called The Chambers, a members-only area of the hotel. There
were about 250 people in six rooms. Inside, the staff was serving
sandwiches and alcohol. People were nervous, but cautiously optimistic.
We were told The Chambers was the safest place we could be because the
army was now guarding its two entrances and the streets were still
dangerous. There had been attacks at a major railway station and a
hospital.

But then, a member of parliament phoned into a live newscast and let the
world know that hundreds of people--including CEOs, foreigners and
members of parliament-- were "secure and safe in The Chambers together."
Adding to the escalating tension and chaos was the fact that, via text
and cellphone, we knew that the dome of the Taj was on fire and that it
could move downward.

At around 2 a.m., the staff attempted an evacuation. We all lined up to
head down a dark fire escape exit. But after five minutes, grenade
blasts and automatic weapon fire pierced the air. A mad stampede ensued
to get out of the stairwell and take cover back inside The Chambers.

After that near-miss, my wife and I decided we should hide in different
rooms. While we hoped to be together at the end, our primary obligation
was to our children. We wanted to keep one parent alive. Because I am
American and my wife is Indian, and news reports said the terrorists
were targeting U.S. and U.K. nationals, I believed I would further
endanger her life if we were together in a hostage situation.

So when we ran back to The Chambers I hid in a toilet stall with a
floor-to-ceiling door and my wife stayed with our friends, who fled to a
large room across the hall.

For the next seven hours, I lay in the fetal position, keeping in touch
with Anjali via BlackBerry. I was joined in the stall by Joe, a Nigerian
national with a U.S. green card. I managed to get in touch with the FBI,
and several agents gave me status updates throughout the night.

I cannot even begin to explain the level of adrenaline running through
my system at this point. It was this hyper-aware state where every
sound, every smell, every piece of information was ultra-acute, analyzed
and processed so that we could make the best decisions and maximize the
odds of survival.

Was the fire above us life-threatening? What floor was it on? Were the
commandos near us, or were they terrorists? Why is it so quiet? Did the
commandos survive? If the terrorists come into the bathroom and to the
door, when they fire in, how can I make my body as small as possible? If
Joe gets killed before me in this situation, how can I throw his body on
mine to barricade the door? If the Indian commandos liberate the rest in
the other room, how will they know where I am? Do the terrorists have
suicide vests? Will the roof stand? How can I make sure the FBI knows
where Anjali and I are? When is it safe to stand up and attempt to
urinate?

Meanwhile, Anjali and the others were across the corridor in a mass of
people lying on the floor and clinging to each other. People barely
moved for seven hours, and for the last three hours they felt it was too
unsafe to even text. While I was tucked behind a couple walls of marble
and granite in my toilet stall, she was feet from bullets flying back
and forth. After our failed evacuation, most of the people in the fire
escape stairwell and many staff members who attempted to protect the
guests were shot and killed.

The 10 minutes around 2:30 a.m. were the most frightening. Rather than
the back-and-forth of gunfire, we just heard single, punctuated shots.
We later learned that the terrorists went along a different corridor of
The Chambers, room by room, and systematically executed everyone: women,
elderly, Muslims, Hindus, foreigners. A group huddled next to Anjali was
devout Bori Muslims who would have been slaughtered just like everyone
else, had the terrorists gone into their room. Everyone was in deep
prayer and most, Anjali included, had accepted that their lives were
likely over. It was terrorism in its purest form. No one was spared.

The next five hours were filled with the sounds of an intense
grenade/gun battle between the Indian commandos and the terrorists. It
was fought in darkness; each side was trying to outflank the other.

By the time dawn broke, the commandos had successfully secured our
corridor. A young commando led out the people packed into Anjali's room.
When one woman asked whether it was safe to leave, the commando replied:
"Don't worry, you have nothing to fear. The first bullets have to go
through me."

The corridor was laced with broken glass and bullet casings. Every table
was turned over or destroyed. The ceilings and walls were littered with
hundreds of bullet holes. Blood stains were everywhere, though,
fortunately, there were no dead bodies to be seen.

A few minutes after Anjali had vacated, Joe and I peeked out of our
stall. We saw multiple commandos and smiled widely. I had lost my right
shoe while sprinting to the toilet so I grabbed a sheet from the floor,
wrapped it around my foot and proceeded to walk over the debris to the
hotel lobby.

Anjali and I embraced for the first time in seven hours in the Taj's
ground floor entrance. I didn't know whether she was dead or injured
because we hadn't been able to text for the past three hours.

I wanted to take a picture of us on my BlackBerry, but Anjali wanted us
to get out of there before doing anything.

She was right--our ordeal wasn't completely over. A large bus pulled up
in front of the Taj to collect us and, just about as it was fully
loaded, gunfire erupted again. The terrorists were still alive and
firing automatic weapons at the bus. Anjali was the last to get on the
bus, and she eventually escaped in our friend's car. I ducked under some
concrete barriers for cover and wound up the subject of photos that were
later splashed across the media. Shortly thereafter, an ambulance came
and drove a few of us to safety. An hour later, Anjali and I were again
reunited at her parents' home. Our Thanksgiving had just gained a lot
more meaning.

Some may say our survival was due to random luck, others might credit
divine intervention. But 72 hours removed from these events, I can
assure you only one thing: Far fewer people would have survived if it
weren't for the extreme selflessness shown by the Taj staff, who
organized us, catered to us and then, in the end, literally died for us.

They complemented the extreme bravery and courage of the Indian
commandos, who, in a pitch-black setting and unfamiliar, tightly packed
terrain, valiantly held the terrorists at bay.

It is also amazing that, out of our entire group, not one person
screamed or panicked. There was an eerie but quiet calm that
pervaded--one more thing that got us all out alive. Even people in
adjacent rooms, who were being executed, kept silent.

It is much easier to destroy than to build, yet somehow humanity has
managed to build far more than it has ever destroyed. Likewise, in a
period of crisis, it is much easier to find faults and failings rather
than to celebrate the good deeds. It is now time to commemorate our
heroes.

- Michael Pollack is a general partner of Glenhill Capital, a firm he
co-founded in 2001.

[Kalan]

Mihir Naniwadekar, Legal blogger - Law and Legal Developments, "The Mumbai Attacks and the Link to Pakistan", available in two parts:
http://legaldevelopments.blogspot.com/2008/12/mumbai-attacks-and-link-to-pakistan.html
http://legaldevelopments.blogspot.com/2008/12/mumbai-attacks-the-link-to-pakistan.html

The author discusses the legal implications arising out of the alleged links to Pakistan, and reaches the following conclusions:

* It may be difficult for India to prove that the state of Pakistan itself is responsible for the Mumbai attacks. In order to prove this, it appears that India will have to meet a very high standard of proof.
* However, insofar as India alleges that “elements in Pakistan” (not controlled by the state of Pakistan) are involved, the standard of proof is much lower. In my opinion, even if we look only at the available facts highlighted in my earlier post, India can easily satisfy this lower burden. In this light, the statements from Pakistan that there is “not sufficient evidence” are misplaced.
* This means that although Pakistan is not responsible for the attacks, it is responsible for allowing its territory to be used for the attacks. State Sovereignty includes – by necessary implication –an obligation not to allow a state’s territory to be used by non-state actors to carry out armed attacks against other states.

Dilip, Legal blogger - Law and Other Things, "Diplomacy: The New opium for the masses" available at
http://lawandotherthings.blogspot.com/2008/12/diplomacy-new-opium-for-masses.html

Extremely hard hitting. Strong on content and also on language.

"The PM’s idea of an investigative agency may have its advantages but is relatively worthless from the standpoint of either prevention or diplomatic persuasion. Those willing to believe our claims have already come around to our view point while those who refuse to be convinced show no sign of changing their position. Besides, the foot soldiers involved here are ready to die during the operation and their masters are beyond our reach. With an enduring supply of cadre at their disposal, they can afford to use a fresh group for every attack. That means convicting those found this time is of no help to prevent the next outrage. Why this has suddenly become an urgent priority is therefore not clear.

To paraphrase Churchill, we have repeatedly chosen dishonor over war. War has therefore now been thrust upon us. It is time to strike back."

[Kalan]

Mihir Naniwadekar, Legal blogger - Law and Legal Developments, "The Mumbai Attacks and the Link to Pakistan", available in two parts:
http://legaldevelopments.blogspot.com/2008/12/mumbai-attacks-and-link-to-pakistan.html
http://legaldevelopments.blogspot.com/2008/12/mumbai-attacks-the-link-to-pakistan.html

The author discusses the legal implications arising out of the alleged links to Pakistan, and reaches the following conclusions:

* It may be difficult for India to prove that the state of Pakistan itself is responsible for the Mumbai attacks. In order to prove this, it appears that India will have to meet a very high standard of proof.
* However, insofar as India alleges that “elements in Pakistan” (not controlled by the state of Pakistan) are involved, the standard of proof is much lower. In my opinion, even if we look only at the available facts highlighted in my earlier post, India can easily satisfy this lower burden. In this light, the statements from Pakistan that there is “not sufficient evidence” are misplaced.
* This means that although Pakistan is not responsible for the attacks, it is responsible for allowing its territory to be used for the attacks. State Sovereignty includes – by necessary implication –an obligation not to allow a state’s territory to be used by non-state actors to carry out armed attacks against other states.

Dilip, Legal blogger - Law and Other Things, "Diplomacy: The New opium for the masses" available at
http://lawandotherthings.blogspot.com/2008/12/diplomacy-new-opium-for-masses.html

Extremely hard hitting. Strong on content and also on language.

"The PM’s idea of an investigative agency may have its advantages but is relatively worthless from the standpoint of either prevention or diplomatic persuasion. Those willing to believe our claims have already come around to our view point while those who refuse to be convinced show no sign of changing their position. Besides, the foot soldiers involved here are ready to die during the operation and their masters are beyond our reach. With an enduring supply of cadre at their disposal, they can afford to use a fresh group for every attack. That means convicting those found this time is of no help to prevent the next outrage. Why this has suddenly become an urgent priority is therefore not clear.

To paraphrase Churchill, we have repeatedly chosen dishonor over war. War has therefore now been thrust upon us. It is time to strike back."

[dissertation writing service]

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